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The Public Interest, Convenience, or
Necessity: A Dead Standard in the Era of
Broadcast Deregulation?
The [Federal Communications] Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby, . . .shall
grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for
by this act.1
I.

Introduction

The Communications Act of 19342 established the Federal
Communications Commission 3 and directed it to license broadcasting stations using as its standard "the public convenience,
interest, or necessity."'4 Although the standard is somewhat
vague, the Commission developed a number of policies designed
to protect the public interest as it is served by broadcasting.'

1. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-805 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
3. Id. § 151. The Act gave the newly formed Commission broad jurisdiction to regulate "interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio" as described in the Act's
title. Within this jurisdiction were radio broadcasting (Subchapter III) and common carriers (Subchapter II), among other things. Television, in its infancy at the time, was not
mentioned specifically in the Act; however, television uses radio frequencies for transmission. See, e.g., S. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 31, 34, 51-52 (3d ed. 1976). Television
thus came within the Commission's jurisdiction over radio broadcasting. Transmission
by government-owned stations was excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction. 47
U.S.C. § 305. Cable television did not exist when the Act was passed; however, as this
technology developed and started to play an increasing role in the communications marketplace, the Commission asserted jurisdiction over it. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
5. For example, the nonentertainment programming guidelines, 47 C.F.R. §
0.281(a)(8) (1982), which required stations to program a prescribed amount of
nonentertainment (generally news and public affairs) programming; the requirement that
stations maintain their main origination studios within their communities of license, 47
C.F.R. § 73.1125 (1986), which was intended to ensure that stations would stay in contact
with their communities of license; the ascertainment rules, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971), 53
F.C.C.2d 3 (1975), 57 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975), and 61 F.C.C.2d 1 (1976), which required that
stations conduct formal studies every year to determine the significant problems and
needs of their communities and develop programming designed to address those
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However, during the 1980s, a mood of deregulation and freemarket competition swept through Washington, and much of the
broadcast regulation designed to ensure that radio and television
stations serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity was
eliminated.' In many cases, regulations were eliminated to reduce what broadcasting stations themselves considered overly
burdensome requirements. 7 However, the Commission also eliminated or substantially relaxed regulations designed to promote
the public interest through diversity of viewpoint, programming,
and ownership, something it has long considered important."
This Comment will focus on three specific deregulatory actions
the Commission has taken in recent years: the relaxation and
elimination of the multiple ownership rule;9 the relaxation of the
radio duopoly rule; 10 and the relaxation of the one-to-a-market
rule. "
Section II of this Comment will provide a brief overview of
the history and evolution of broadcast regulation and the public
interest standard, and will describe some of the policies the
Commission adopted to ensure that stations would serve the
public interest; Section III will describe the elimination or relaxation of these policies; Section IV will describe twenty-four hour
problems and needs; and the anti-trafficking provision, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597 (1982), which
strongly discouraged licensees from selling their stations unless they had owned them for
at least three years. This provision was intended to ensure that licensees maintained a
commitment to the public interest in the community of license; the Commission considered ownership turnover in less than three years inimical to the public interest. Report
and Order, 32 F.C.C. 689, 690-91 (1962).
6. Such eliminations included: the nonentertainment programming guidelines, 84
F.C.C.2d 968 (1981); the main studio rule, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 3215 (1987); the ascertainment
requirement, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981); and the anti-trafficking provision, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1081 (1982).
7. For example, stations argued that they could, and would, ascertain the problems
and needs of their communities without a formal procedure imposed by the Commission.
See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1076-77 (1981); cf. S. HEAD, supra note 3, at
354.
8. See Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
F.C.C.2d 306, 310 (1970); Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1
F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
9. Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) [hereinafter the Multiple Ownership
Decision].
10. Report and Order, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723 (1989) [hereinafter the Duopoly Decision].
11. Report and Order, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1741 (1989) [hereinafter the One-to-a-Market
Decision]. The one-to-a-market rule was also known as the radio/television cross ownership rule. Id.
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satellite radio programming services, a recent development
which has had a substantial impact on the broadcasting industry
and on its service of the public interest; and Section V will analyze the status of the public interest standard in light of the
Commission's deregulation of the broadcast industry.
II.

History of Broadcast Regulation and Establishment of the
Public Interest Standard

A.

The Genesis of Broadcast Regulation

Regulation of radio (or "wireless," as it was called at the
time) began in the United States in 1910 with the amendment of
the Interstate Commerce Act, 2 bringing interstate and foreign
wire and wireless communication under federal jurisdiction. 3
Also in 1910, the Wireless Ship Act was enacted.14 This Act required large passenger ships to carry radio equipment capable of
exchanging messages at a distance of 100 miles,13 but it did not
require ship radio operators to monitor their radio apparatus.
On April 15, 1912, the ocean liner Titanic sank. 6 Although
another radio-equipped ship, the Californian, was only fifteen
miles away, its radio operator had signed off fifteen minutes
before the Titanic's operator sent his first distress message."
More than 1500 people were killed in the disaster, including the
Titanic's radio operator, who died at his radio set.1 8
As a direct result of this tragedy, 9 the Radio Act of 191220
was enacted. This was the first comprehensive American radio
legislation. Among other things, the Act adopted the international distress signal,21 prohibited interference with distress sig-

12. 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
13. S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 127.
14. 36 Stat. 629 (1910).
15. Id. § 1.
16. Ballard, How We Found Titanic, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 696, 704 (December 1985).
17. S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 127.
18. Id.
19. W. BITTNER, BROADCAST LAW AND REGULATION 5 (1982). See also S. HEAD, supra
note 3, at 94, 127.
20. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
21. Id. § 4 (Sixth). (The Radio Act was divided into subsections denoted "First,"
"Second," and so forth.)
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nals,22 and empowered the Secretary of Commerce and Labor2 3
25
to issue licenses 24 and specify frequencies.
One of the weaknesses of the 1912 Act was that it failed to
specify grounds upon which the Secretary could deny applications for radio licenses. Congress had intended the Act simply to
prescribe a registration process. 26 This became a serious problem
as broadcasting stations, dramatically rising in number,2 7 began
increasingly to interfere with one another. 28 Many station operators understandably grew frustrated by the interference and, attempting to increase the efficacy of their signals, began to
change frequency, power, location, and operating schedule in violation of their licenses.29 One such station was Zenith Radio
Corporation's WJAZ in Chicago. The Secretary of Commerce

22. Id. § 4 (Ninth).
23. The Secretary of Commerce and Labor became known as the Secretary of Commerce in 1913. S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 128.
24. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-624, § 1, 37 Stat. 302, 302-03 (1912), repealed
by ch. 169, § 39, 44 Stat. 1162, 1174, which was repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
25. Id. § 2.
26. S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 128.
27. There were only "about three" stations providing regular service in 1920. W.
EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT 23 (1971). By the end of 1925 there were almost
600 stations on the air and 175 applications for new stations. National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943).
28. Part of the problem was that there was a very limited number of frequencies
(channels) available for stations to use. The 1912 Act had not specified which frequencies
were to be used for broadcasting. The Secretary of Commerce initially selected two frequencies (750 and 833 kHz) on which all broadcasting stations were to operate. National
Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 211. Later, with the number of stations growing rapidly, he
assigned 96 frequencies between 550 and 1500 kHz (roughly the same as today's AM
band) to standard (AM) broadcasting. Id. Unfortunately, this was not enough to solve
the problem. The interference situation was exacerbated by the instability of the stations' transmitters; among other things, the transmitters were incapable of remaining
precisely on their assigned frequencies.
An amusing example was the radio station of Aimee Semple McPherson, a popular
evangelist of the 1920s. The station, operated from McPherson's "temple" in Los Angeles, was closed down by a government inspector because it "wandered all over the wave
band." S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 129. McPherson then sent a telegram to the Secretary:
"PLEASE ORDER YOUR MINIONS OF SATAN TO LEAVE MY STATION ALONE.
YOU CANNOT EXPECT THE ALMIGHTY TO ABIDE BY YOUR WAVELENGTH
NONSENSE. WHEN I OFFER MY PRAYERS TO HIM I MUST FIT INTO HIS
WAVE RECEPTION. OPEN THIS STATION AT ONCE." Id. McPherson was persuaded to hire a competent engineer and the station was allowed to reopen. Id.
29. S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 129.
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sued Zenith under the Radio Act of 1912, but the court held3"
that the Act had given the Secretary no standards under which
he could deny a station's license application."
With the Secretary thus stripped of what little discretion he
may have had in licensing stations, and with increasingly intolerable interference undermining the effectiveness of radio broadcasting, the failure of the Radio Act of 1912 became apparent.
More than 200 new stations received licenses and went on the
air during the next year, 3 making the interference situation
even worse. Ultimately, it became difficult for people in many
parts of
the country to receive any interference-free radio service
33
at all.

It was obvious that new radio legislation was needed. The
result was the Radio Act of 1927,1" which established the fivemember Federal Radio Commission.3 5 Perhaps the most impor-

tant departure from the 1912 Act was that the newly created
Commission had discretion in licensing stations: it was to award
would serve the "pubbroadcasting licenses only when doing so
36
lic convenience, interest, or necessity.

This public interest standard was not a new concept in governmental regulation in 1927. Starting in the late 1800s, much of
Congress' regulation of the railroads focused on the public interest standard.3 7 Over the years it has been applied in the regulation of two basic and interrelated types of activities: first, activities involving government-granted monopolies; 38 and second, use
1926).
30. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill.
31. Id. at 618.
32. S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 130.
33. Id. at 130-31.
34. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
35. Id. § 3.
36. Id. § 9.
37. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld Congress' right to regulate the use of private property when the use was
"affected with a public interest." Id. at 130. Private property became "clothed with a
public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the
community at large." Id. at 126.
38. Among these are telephone companies and power utilities, where monopolies
may be necessary because of the impracticability of separate telephone and electrical
wires installed by different companies in the same area; also included are railroads,
where limited rights-of-way preclude the operation of more than one company's railroad.
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of public resources by private individuals or entities for private
gain.39 Its first application to broadcasting was in the Radio Act
of 1927.
Under the 1927 Act, however, control of communication by
wire and radio was still spread among a number of agencies."' In
1934, the Communications Act of 193441 was enacted. The Act
repealed the Radio Act of 1927,42 established the seven member
Federal Communications Commission, 43 and consolidated the
regulation of most wire and radio communication under the
Commission's jurisdiction.4 4 Most importantly, the 1934 Act preserved the public interest, convenience, or necessity standard
from the 1927 Act.4 5
B.

Evolution of the Public Interest Standard

There is good reason for applying a public interest standard
in broadcast regulation. Broadcast channels are "scarce" (that is,
there are not enough available channels for all of those who wish
to broadcast), and the electromagnetic spectrum 46 has been
deemed, since the beginning of broadcast regulation, to be a

See, e.g., Essential Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 610 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d
Cir. 1979).
39. Again, telephone companies and power utilities are included here because they
use public land for the installation of wires; likewise, railroad tracks run on public land.
Of course, these industries are allowed to profit from their use of publicly owned resources, as long as there is a corresponding public benefit. See, e.g., United States v.
Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U.S. 505, 570 (1898).
40. Jurisdiction of wire and wireless communication was split among the Federal
Radio Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Postmaster General.
S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 133.
41. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-805 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
42. Id. § 602(a).
43. Id. § 151.
44. Id. § 601. Jurisdiction over government-owned stations was excluded. Id. § 305.
45. The language regarding the public interest standard is essentially the same in
both Acts. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982) with § 9 of the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L.
No. 69-169, § 9, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). The objectives of both Acts were substantially the
same. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) (in essence, the
1934 Act repealed the 1927 Act and reenacted its provisions); 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 601, 603,
604 (1962 & Supp. 1989).
46. The spectrum of electromagnetic radiation includes all television and radio
channels, both broadcast and nonbroadcast (aviation, police, fire, and mobile telephone,
to name a few). For a more detailed explanation of the nature of electromagnetic radiation, see S. HEAD, supra note 3, at 21-57.
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publicly owned natural resource.47 This "scarce public resource"
rationale formed the foundation on which broadcast regulation
was based. 8 Furthermore, it is plain that private individuals and
entities may apply for and be granted licenses to use the public
airwaves; and it is equally plain that unless they are operating
on channels reserved for non-commercial use,49 these private individuals or entities are allowed to profit from their broadcasting
activities." Application of the public interest standard to broadcasting is thus consistent with its traditional application in other
governmental regulation.
The application of the standard to broadcasting, however, is
perhaps more complex than it is when applied to other industries because of the first amendment considerations involved. 1
The search for a manageable standard was difficult. In 1928, the
Federal Radio Commission announced its interpretation of the
basic principles of the standard:
The commission also believes that public interest, convenience, or necessity will be best served by avoiding too much duplication of programs and types of programs....

47. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934 § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) ("It is the
purpose of this Act . . . to provide for the use of [the airwaves], but not the ownership
thereof ....
"); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) ("The
policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the nature of a property
right as a result of the granting of a [broadcast] license.").
48. See National Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
Note that this scarcity rationale, used to justify the application of a public interest standard. in government regulation, is consistent with the government-granted monopoly rationale. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. An entity licensed to broadcast on a
frequency has exclusive control, granted by the government, over that frequency in that
geographic area; simultaneous use of the frequency by another user would cause objectionable interference. It was just this kind of interference which led to chaos on the
airwaves during the 1920s and the subsequent enactment of the Radio Act of 1927. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 33; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969).
49. The Commission has reserved FM channels 200-220 (87.9-91.9 MHz) for noncommercial educational use. 47 C.F.R. § 73.501 (1988). Additionally, a number of television assignments are reserved for non-commercial educational use. 47 C.F.R. § 73.606
(1988).
50. This is the public-resource/private-user/private-gain rationale, which also justified application of a public interest standard. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
51. The application of the first amendment here concerns not as much the broadcasters' rights of free speech as the public's right to be informed. See infra notes 52-55
and accompanying text; text accompanying note 98; note 185; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 38692.
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In view of the paucity of channels, the commission is of the
opinion that the limited facilities for broadcasting should not be
shared with stations which give the sort of service which is readily
available to the public in another form. For example, the public
in large cities can easily purchase and use phonograph records of
the ordinary commercial type. A station which devotes the main
portion of its hours of operation to broadcasting such phonograph
records is not giving the public anything which it can not readily
have without such a station .... The commission can not close its
eyes to the fact that the real purpose of the use of phonograph
records in most communities is to provide a cheaper method of
advertising for advertisers who are thereby saved the expense of
providing an original program.
While it is true that broadcasting stations in this country are
for the most part supported or partially supported by advertisers,
broadcasting stations are not given these great privileges by the
United States Government for the primary benefit of advertisers.
Such benefit as is derived by advertisers must be incidental and
entirely secondary to the interest of the public....
Advertising should be only incidental to some real service
rendered to the public, and not the main object of the
program ...
In conclusion, the commission desires to point out that the
test - "public interest, convenience, or necessity" - becomes a
matter of comparative and not an absolute standard when applied to broadcasting stations. Since the number of channels is
limited and the number of persons desiring to broadcast is far
greater than can be accommodated, the commission must determine from among the applicants before it which of them will, if
licensed, best serve the public. . . . The emphasis must be first
and foremost on the interest, the convenience, and the necessity
of the listening public, and not on the interest, convenience, or
necessity of the individual broadcaster or the advertiser. 2

52. Statement Made by the (Federal Radio] Commission on Aug. 23, 1928, Relative
to Public Interest, Convenience, or Necessity, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 166 (1928), reprinted
in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 52-55 (F. Kahn ed. 3d ed. 1978). See also In
re Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., F.R.C. Docket No. 4900, cited with approval in Public
Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (the FCC's "Blue Book," Mar. 7, 1946,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTERS, supra, at 132):
Broadcasting stations are licensed to serve the public and not for the purpose of
furthering the private or selfish interests of individuals or groups of individuals.
The standard of public interest, convenience, or necessity means nothing if it does
not mean this....
The emphasis should be on the receiving of service and the
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As radio became increasingly influential in American society, references to first amendment concerns for a vigorous press
started to appear in court and Commission decisions. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,53 Justice Murphy
wrote:
Although radio broadcasting, like the press, is generally conducted on a commercial basis, it is not an ordinary business activity, like the selling of securities or the marketing of electrical
power. In the dissemination of information and opinion, radio has
assumed a position of commanding importance, rivalling the press
and the pulpit. Owing to its physical characteristics radio, unlike
the other methods of conveying information, must be regulated
and rationed by the government. Otherwise there would be chaos,
and radio's usefulness would be largely destroyed. But because of
its vast potentialities as a medium of communication, discussion
and propaganda, the character and extent of control that should
be exercised over it by the government is a matter of deep and
vital concern.54
In 1965, the Commission expressed its view of broadcasters'
first amendment responsibilities:
As the Supreme Court has stated, the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States "rests on the assumption that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."
That radio and television broadcast stations play an important
role in providing news and opinion is obvious. 5
Thus, as broadcasting evolved to play an increasingly imstandard of public interest, convenience, or necessity should be construed accordingly.... In a sense a broadcasting station may be regarded as a sort of mouthpiece on the air for the community it serves, over which its public events of general interest, its political campaigns, its election results, its athletic contests, its
orchestras and artists, and discussion of public issues may be broadcast.
Id. at 155-56 (emphasis in original). It is important to note that these articulations of the
public interest standard established criteria against which stations could be evaluated.
As important as these criteria were when two or more applicants were battling for a new
license, they became even more important when one or more applicants challenged an
incumbent broadcaster's license. See infra notes 87, 90, and 157 for a brief description of
the comparative hearing process.

53. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
54. Id. at 228 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
55. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 n.4
(1965) (citation omitted). See infra text accompanying note 94.
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portant role in American society, the interpretation of the public
interest standard as applied to broadcasting grew to take on
constitutional proportions. The Commission's concern in this
area was manifested through the establishment of a number of
rules and procedures intended to ensure that broadcast licensees
served the public interest.5 6
The public interest standard as it applies to broadcasting
has never been interpreted to mean simply what the public
wants to hear or view. Rather, much of the scholarly writing on
the standard focuses also on what the public ought to hear or
view. 57 This phrasing perhaps only restates the first amendment
concerns of the courts and the Commission that an informed
electorate is essential to the effective working of democratic government.5" Unless the electorate has sufficient information to
make informed decisions, democratic government cannot work. 9
The theory underlying broadcast regulation is that a broadcast license is a public trust, and that a broadcast licensee is
l
therefore a public trustee.6 0 A license is temporary authority
from the federal government to use one of the scarce and publicly owned broadcast channels. 2 In exchange for the privilege of
using this scarce public resource and for being allowed to profit
from such use, the licensee is obligated to serve the public inter63
est, convenience, or necessity.

56. For a discussion of these rules and procedures, see infra notes 64-98 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Irion, FCC Criteriafor Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L.
REV. 479, 481 (1959) ("a broadcaster must not merely cater to existing tastes and interests but must make at least a modest effort toward improving and widening them"); J.
TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION 151 (1986) ("critics were ...
comparing U.S.
radio with junk food - 20 different kinds of fast food, but no nourishing meals
58. See infra note 232.
59. See, e.g., Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 980-82 (1981).
60. See McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 151 F.2d 597,
599 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946).
61. The maximum license term was originally three years. Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1083, 1084 (1934) (redesignated and amended 1981). In
1987 it was increased to seven years for radio stations and five years for television stations. Order, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 3805 (1987). See infra note 157.
62. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982).
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C. FCC Policies to Exact Compliance with the Public Interest
Standard
It is beyond question that the electronic mass media have
tremendous potential power for disseminating news and information to the public." To ensure that stations exercised this
power responsibly, the Commission established a number of
rules and procedures. Among these were the nonentertainment
programming guidelines for both radio and television.6 ' These
guidelines were intended to ensure that stations devoted a specified percentage of their broadcast schedules to news and public
affairs programming." Stations were also required to maintain
their main origination studios within their communities of license, 67 and to conduct annual "ascertainment studies." 8 The

64. A recent study by the Roper Organization indicated that 65 percent of the
American public turn to television as the source of most of their news, and 49 percent
consider television to be the most believable news source. Roper Organization, America's
Watching: Thirtieth Anniversary Report at 14-15 (1989). See also 67 CONG. REc. 5558-59
(bound ed. Mar. 13, 1926) (statement of Rep. Johnson):
There is no agency so fraught with possibilities for service of good or evil to the
American people as the radio. As a means of entertainment, education, information, and communication it has limitless possibilities. The power of the press will
not be comparable to that of broadcasting stations when the industry is fully developed. . . . [Broadcasting stations] can mold and crystallize sentiment as no
agency in the past has been able to do. If the strong arm of the law does not
prevent monopoly ownership and make discrimination by such stations illegal,
American thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who
operate these stations. For publicity is the most powerful weapon that can be
wielded in a Republic, and when such a weapon is placed in the hands of one, or a
single selfish group is permitted to either tacitly or otherwise acquire ownership
and dominate these broadcasting stations throughout the country, then woe be to
those who dare to differ with them. It will be impossible to compete with them in
reaching the ears of the American people.
65. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a)(8) (1982).
66. Id.
67. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125 (1986).
68. 61 F.C.C.2d 1 (1976); 57 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975); 53 F.C.C.2d 3 (1975); 27 F.C.C.2d
650 (1971). The Commission first required commercial stations to conduct ascertainment
studies in the Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission en banc Programming
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314, 2316 (1960). In 1971 the Commission issued its detailed
Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d
650, 682-87 (1971), and in 1975 its Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d 418, 441-46 (1975), amended by 61 F.C.C.2d
1 (1976).
Under the Commission's procedure, each commercial broadcast licensee was required to conduct annual interviews with members of the general public, 57 F.C.C.2d at
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Commission had long put a premium on local programming
serving demonstrated public needs. 9 These rules were designed
to ensure that stations would stay in touch with the problems
and needs of their communities, and that they would air programming responsive to those problems and needs. 70 The Commission's intention was that stations participate directly in the
discussion of issues of public importance.
These rules and procedures were an attempt by the Commission to ensure that stations used the frequencies they had
been allowed to use for the dissemination of local news and public affairs at least some of the time (and to establish minimum
standards against which stations could be measured when their
licenses came up for renewal 71). However, there was also a number of more or less technical rules intended to ensure that the
broadcasting industry as a whole served the public interest.
Among these was the "anti-trafficking rule, 72 which regulated
the transfer of broadcast licenses. The Commission believed that
trafficking in licenses (buying and then quickly selling stations
for profit) undermined service to the public interest because the
station owners never developed a sense of responsibility to the
7
community of licenses.
The anti-trafficking rule strongly discouraged the sale of a station unless the station owner had held
the license for at least three years.
Recall that there are two basic rationales for applying a
444-45, and with leaders of significant community groups, id. at 442-44; 27 F.C.C.2d at
682-85. From these interviews, the licensee was to list significant community problems
and needs, 57 F.C.C.2d at 419, and then develop and air programming addressing at least
some of those problems and needs. 27 F.C.C.2d at 685-86. The written records of the
interviews, the list of problems and needs, and the descriptions of the programming were
reviewed when the station's license came up for renewal (every three years). For details
of these procedures, see Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 53 F.C.C.2d 3 (1975).
69. See, e.g., Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission en banc Programming
Inquiry, supra note 68, at 2312-16; the Commission's "Blue Book," reprinted in DocuMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING, supra note 52, at 183-88; National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 203 (1943).
70. Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry,
supra note 68, at 2312-18.
71. See infra notes 87, 90, 157, and accompanying text for a brief discussion of license renewal procedures, challenges, and comparative hearings.
72. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597 (1982).
73. See Report and Order, 32 F.C.C.2d 689, 690 (1962).
74. Id. at 691.
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public interest standard in broadcast regulation. First, frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum have always been considered to be a scarce and publicly owned natural resource.7 5 It was
apparent even in the 1920s that there was a far greater number
of people who wanted to broadcast than there were available frequencies.7 6 Secoid, this scarce public resource was being used by
private users for private gain.7 7
Consistent with and even necessary to both of these rationales were the Commission's rules regarding multiple ownership.
The Commission always had a strong policy favoring diversity of
viewpoints and programming in the communications marketplace.7 8 It endeavored through several rules to promote this policy by maximizing the number of owners of media outlets.
First, the multiple ownership rule 79 limited the number of
stations a single entity could own to seven AM, seven FM, and
seven television stations, no more than five of which could be
VHF ("rule of sevens")."0 This rule was intended to prevent a
single group owner from becoming overly dominant in the national marketplace of ideas.
Second, the radio duopoly rule8 established minimum geographic distances between commonly owned stations in the same
service.2 This rule was an attempt to minimize the local geo-

75. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
76. See Remarks of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Fourth National Radio
Conference, Proceedings and Recommendations for Regulation of Radio 6 (November 911, 1925), quoted in W. EMERY, supra note 27, at 28: "We can no longer deal on the basis
that there is room for everybody on the radio highways. There are more vehicles on the
roads than can get by, and if they continue to jam in, all will be stopped."
77. See supra notes 39, 50, and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393,
394-96 (1965).
79. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1984).
80. An entity that owns more than one broadcast station in a single service (Standard (AM), FM, and television are the three broadcast services) is commonly referred to
as a group owner.
81. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1988).
82. Standard (AM), FM, and television are the three broadcast services; therefore,
the rule required a certain minimum distance between two commonly owned AM stations, two commonly owned FM stations, or two commonly owned television stations.
The minimum distance was not specified in miles, but rather in terms of the signal
strength from each station. The rule prohibited overlap of the 1 mv/m signal strength
contours for the commonly owned stations. The strength of any station's signal at a particular point is measured in millivolts of radio frequency energy induced by the station's
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graphic areas in which two different stations in the same service
under common ownership could be heard; it was intended to reduce the possibility of an undue concentration of media control
within a particular local marketplace of ideas.
Third, the one-to-a-market rule8 3 prohibited cross-ownership of radio and television stations in the same market, excepting grandfathered radio-television combinations. 4 Like the radio
duopoly rule, the one-to-a-market rule was intended to reduce
the likelihood that a single entity would become overly dominant within a local market.
These three rules reflected both the first amendment concern that broadcasting serve the public interest and the desire to
distribute equitably and fairly the limited number of broadcast
licenses among the greatest possible number of applicants.8 5 The
vigor of the Commission's commitment to maximum diversification of ownership was evident in its 1965 Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings. 6 The Commission stated:
We believe that there are two primary objectives toward which
the process of comparison [in comparative hearings8 7] should be
signal in a wire that is one meter long; hence, the unit millivolts per meter, or mv/m.
R.H. KINLEY, STANDARD RADIO COMMUNICATIONS MANUAL 31 (1985). A 1 mv/m contour is
the set of all points surrounding the station's antenna, on the surface of the earth, at
which the signal strength is 1 mv/m. The higher the number of mv/m, the stronger and
therefore clearer the signal. A signal strength of 1 mv/m produces a good signal for FM
radios and a fair signal for AM radios. Telephone interview with Edward F. Perry, Jr.,
Technical Consultant, Educational FM Associates, Duxbury, Mass. (Apr. 10, 1990).
83. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1988).
84. 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 309 (1970). The radio duopoly and one-to-9-market rules were
known together as the local (or regional) concentration rules.
85. The rule of sevens was something of a compromise of the Commission's policy of
maximum diversification. For a discussion of this policy, see infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. The compromise was adopted to avoid undue disruption of multiple
station holdings at the time. the rule was promulgated. Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288,
295 (1953). The Commission granted waivers of the local concentration rules from time
to time when such waivers were found to be in the public interest. See, e.g., Hawaiian
Broadcasting System, 8 F.C.C. 379 (1941). However, the rule of sevens was inflexible. See
W. EMERY, supra note 27, at 249-50 (regardless of the facts, no entity could own more
than seven AM, seven FM, and seven television stations, no more than five of which
could be VHF). See also infra note 127.
86. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
87. A comparative hearing is a hearing, held before an FCC administrative law
judge, at which two or more applicants for a single license are represented. The hearing
may occur when two or more applicants apply for a single new license, or when one or
more applicants challenge an incumbent broadcaster's license renewal application. S.
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directed. They are, first, the best practicable service to the public,
and, second, a maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass
communications. The value of these objectives is clear. Diversification of control is a public good in a free society, and is additionally desirable where a government licensing system limits access
by the public to the use of radio and television facilities. ....
1. Diversification of control of the media of mass communications. - Diversification is a factor of primary significance since,
as set forth above, it constitutes a primary objective in the licensing scheme.8 9
.8

The Commission then discussed other factors it would consider in comparative hearings:
2. Full-time participationin station operation by owners. - We
consider this factor to be of substantial importance. It is inherently desirable that legal responsibility and day-to-day performance be closely associated .... This factor is . . .important in
securing the best practicable service. It also frequently complements the objective of diversification, since concentrations of
control are necessarily achieved at the expense of integrated
ownership.
Thus, local residence complements the statutory scheme
and Commission allocation policy of licensing a large number of
stations throughout the country, in order to provide for attention
to local interests, and local ownership also generally accords with
the goal of diversifying control of broadcast stations.90
Thus, under traditional regulation of broadcasting by the
Commission, the goal of maximizing diversity of control of
broadcasting stations at both the national and local levels was
consistently seen as an element of prime importance as it related
to both the scarcity of frequencies concern and the first amendment concern of the public interest, convenience, or necessity
standard. Importantly, the Commission's goal was not to secure

supra note 3, at 348.
88. 1 F.C.C.2d at 394. The Commission's footnote at this point is reproduced in part
as the text accompanying note 55, supra.
89. 1 F.C.C.2d at 394.
90. Id. at 395-96 (emphasis added). The four other factors the Commission said it
would review were: proposed program service, id. at 397-98; past broadcast record, id. at
398; efficient use of frequency, id. at 398-99; and character, id. at 399. The Commission
also noted that it might review other factors if warranted. Id.
HEAD,
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some amount of diversification; rather, it was to secure the maximum possible amount of diversification. In its First Report and
Order amending rules concerning multiple ownership of standard, FM, and television broadcast stations, 91 the Commission
stated:
A proper objective is the maximum diversity of ownership that
technology permits in each area. We are of the view that 60 different licensees are more desirable than 50, and even that 51 are
more desirable than 50. In a rapidly changing social climate, communication of ideas is vital. If a city has 60 frequencies available
but they are licensed to only 50 different licensees, the number of
sources for ideas is not maximized. It might be the 51st licensee
that would become the communication channel for a solution to a
severe local social crisis. No one can say that present licensees are
broadcasting everything worthwhile that can be communicated.2
In its Second Report and Order,9" the Commission underscored the importance of diversification of control:
Our diversification policy is derived from both First Amendment
and anti-trust policy sources. The Federal Courts have consistently upheld our use of these grounds in efforts to promote diversity of control over the electronic media of mass communications.
In its earliest opinions construing the Communications Act, the
Supreme Court recognized that regulation of broadcasting was
designed to preserve competition and prevent monopoly. The Supreme Court said in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: "It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be
by the Government itself or a private licensee." The Court then
concluded: "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here .... 94
The concerns involved in the public interest, convenience,
or necessity standard thus evolved steadily during the period
from 1927 through the 1970s.15 The Commission's primary con91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970).
Id. at 311.
50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
Id. at 1048-49 (citations omitted).
The public interest standard was first applied to broadcasting in 1927. See
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cern at the outset was with fair and equitable distribution of
broadcast facilities in light of the fact that there were not
enough frequencies available for all of those who wanted to
broadcast.96 As the broadcasting industry developed into a major
force in Americap society, the scarcity rationale remained, as indeed it had to, 97 and the public interest standard took on consti-

tutional dimensions. The primary focus of the first amendment
concern became the right, and really the need, of the public to
receive a wide range of information so that our democratic form
of government would work most effectively. Maximum diversification of control of broadcast facilities, nationally and regionally, was a key policy in fulfilling this goal. A broadcast licensee
was a public trustee, given temporary authority by the Commission to use the publicly owned airwaves to serve the public interest. This was the way things stood until the 1980s.

supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. The Commission began deregulating the
broadcasting industry in the 1970s. J. TUNSTALL, supra note 57, at 29. The deregulatory
pace accelerated tremendously under the Reagan administration in the early 1980s. Id.
at 30. All of the deregulatory actions considered in this Comment took place during the
1980s. See infra notes 99-143 and accompanying text.
96. See First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970):
[O]ne person should not be licensed to operate more than one broadcast station in
the same place, and serving substantially the same public, unless some other relevant public interest consideration is found to outweigh the importance of diversifying control. It is elementary that the number of frequencies available for licensing is limited. In any particular area there may be many voices that would like to
be heard, but not all can be licensed.
Id. at 311. See also the discussion of this scarcity rationale, supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
97. With more commercial broadcasting stations on the air now than ever before
(4966 AM, 4251 FM, and 1088 television stations, Summary of Broadcasting & Cable,
BROADCASTING, Dec. 25, 1989, at 11, col. 1), there are obviously fewer available frequencies now on which new stations can be authorized. The available spectrum space cannot
simply be expanded to allow a greater number of broadcast stations to go on the air; to
do so would displace other licensed users, including aircraft, police and fire departments,
and shortwave international broadcasting, among others. There are fewer available channels than ever before, and almost invariably there are numerous applicants for each. See
infra note 157.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55 and 94; infra note 232.
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Deregulation of Broadcasting

Broadcast Deregulation in General

In pursuing its deregulatory agenda, the Commission has
done away with many of the rules and procedures it had earlier
determined were necessary to protect the public interest. For radio, it eliminated the nonentertainment programming guidelines, 99 justifying this by stating that "marketplace solutions can
be consistent with public interest concerns,"1 ° that "significant
amounts of nonentertainment programming of a variety of types
will continue on radio,"10 1 and that "stations will continue to
present such programming as a response to market forces." 10 2 In
the same proceeding, the Commission eliminated the requirement that stations conduct ascertainment studies to determine
the problems and needs of their communities. 0 3 It dismissed
concerns that free market competition would tend to limit
broadcasters in their assessment of community problems to
those of the economically significant segments of the community,'04 and left the methods of assessing community problems
and needs to broadcasters' "good faith discretion."'' 0 5 In this
proceeding, the Commission also eliminated its commercial
guidelines,' 0 6 stating that marketplace forces would more effec-

99. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 971 (1981).
100. Id. at 974.
101. Id. at 977.
102. Id. at 978. The Commission also noted that many commenters were concerned
that it was planning to eliminate the fairness doctrine, see infra text accompanying note
118, among other provisions. 84 F.C.C.2d at 974. (The Commission refers to parties who
file comments in connection with its proceedings as commenters. See, e.g., the Multiple
Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 31 (1984).) However, it supported its elimination
of the nonentertainment guidelines by noting that the fairness doctrine "cannot be modified by the Commission. [It] simply [is] not subject to deregulation by the Commission."
Id. In eliminating the nonentertainment guidelines, the Commission emphasized that
stations would still have to adhere to the fairness doctrine. 84 F.C.C.2d at 979. Yet in
1987, the Commission declared the doctrine unconstitutional, leaving the broadcasting
industry with no explicit requirement that it program any news or public affairs at all.
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043, 5047 (1987). See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
103. 84 F.C.C.2d at 971.
104. Id. at 997-98.
105. Id. at 998.
106. Id. at 971.
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tively curb excessive advertising' 07 and that "[n]o government
regulation should continue unless it achieves some public interest objective that cannot be achieved without the regulation.' 0 8
The television programming and commercialization policies
and ascertainment requirements were also eliminated. 0 9 The
Commission again trusted "market incentives" to take the place
of governmental regulation to ensure that television stations
serve the public interest. 0 Additionally, the requirement that
stations maintain their main origination studios in their cities of
license"' was eliminated in 1987,112 and the anti-trafficking provision"' in 1982.114
Until 1986, the Commission imposed restrictions on AMFM simulcasting.' 5 This restriction was eliminated, and now
commonly owned AM and FM stations in the same market may
simulcast 100% of the time."'
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission declared the fairness doctrine facially unconstitutional." 7 The fair-

107. Id. at 1003.
108. Id. at 1006.
109. Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).
110. Id. at 1077.
111. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125 (1986).
112. 2 F.C.C. Rec. 3215 (1987).
113. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597 (1982).
114. 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081 (1982).
115. 47 C.F.R. § 73.242 (1984). Simulcasting is the practice in which an owner of an
AM and an FM station in the same market airs the same programming on both stations
within 24 hours. Id. § 73.242(b).
116. Report and Order, 103 F.C.C.2d 922 (1986). This allows the common owner to
program two stations at once, saving operating costs by airing the same programming on
both the AM and FM stations. Thus, one of the two frequencies is wasted because two
different frequencies (one AM and one FM) are used to provide a single programming
service. But see supra text accompanying note 92; National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 218 (1943) ("With the number of radio channels limited by natural
factors, the public interest demands that those who are entrusted with the available
channels shall make the fullest and most effective use of them,") (quoting the Commission's Report on Chain [Network] Broadcasting of May 2, 1941). Arbitron, a major radio
ratings service, estimates that 1430 stations are simulcasting under the new rule. Simulcasting: Two Much of a Good Thing, BROADCASTING, Aug. 15, 1988, at 59.
117. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043, 5047 (1987). By this action, the
Commission "undertook, in effect, to overrule the opinion of the Supreme Court in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC [395 U.S. 367 (1967)]." Hyde, FCC Action Repealing the
Fairness Doctrine: A Revolution in Broadcast Regulation, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175,
1175 (1987). Hyde was an FCC Commissioner and Chairman during the 1940s, 1950s,
and 1960s, and was Acting Chairman when the fairness doctrine was promulgated. Id.
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ness doctrine had required stations to air at least some local programming on issues of public importance and to present
opposing viewpoints to balance the presentation." 8 The repeal
of the doctrine is important to note here because the Commission partially justified its elimination of the nonentertainment
guidelines" 9 by emphasizing that stations would have to continue to air balanced programming on issues of public impor1 20
tance under the fairness doctrine.
Underlying all of these deregulatory actions are the notions,
first, that the Commission is still concerned (as it must be) with
the public interest, 21 and second, that the best way to serve the
public interest is to eliminate as much regulation as possible and
allow stations to respond only to the economic incentives of the
"marketplace." This theory is absolutely inadequate. 122
B.

Deregulation of Multiple Ownership

The Commission has a congressional mandate to license
broadcasting stations only when doing so would serve the public
interest, convenience, or necessity. So that it could most effectively carry out this mandate, the Commission established rules,
procedures, and regulations intended to ensure that broadcasting stations, operating under its authority, served the public interest.121 Among these
were the multiple ownership rule, 2 4 the
radio duopoly rule,'12 and the one-to-a-market rule, 26 all in-

The Commission's elimination of the doctrine came less than two months after President Reagan's veto of a congressional attempt to codify it. R. Zaragoza, R. Bodorff, & J.
Emord, The Public Interest Transformed: The Trusteeship Model Gives Way to a Marketplace Approach, in PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE BUSINESS OF BROADCASTING 27, 32, 47-48
nn.66-69 (J. Powell & W. Gair eds. 1988). After his veto of the legislation, President
Reagan stated, "[tihere is no reason to substitute the judgment of Washington bureaucrats for that of professional broadcasters." Radio World Annual at 16 (1989).
118. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
119. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
120. Id. at 976, 979.
121. The Communications Act requires the Commission to license stations only
when doing so would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 47 U.S.C. §
307(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
122. See infra notes 154-245 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 65-98 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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tended to reduce the possibility of an undue concentration of
control both nationally and locally."2 7 These three rules, not only
individually but more particularly in combination, were intimately bound up both with the rationale justifying application
of the public interest standard to broadcasting (the fact that a
scarce public resource is being used, to the exclusion of other
potential users, by a private user for private gain) 2 8 and with
the first amendment concerns that the marketplace of ideas contain as many diverse and antagonistic voices as possible.' 29 However, the Commission, having now decided that free market
competition was somehow better than government regulation of
broadcasting, either eliminated or substantially relaxed all three
of these provisions, in concert with Reagan administration pol3
icy' 30 and pressure from the broadcasting industry itself.1 '
In 1984, the Commission substantially relaxed the multiple
ownership rule: 32 the rule of sevens was changed in 1984 to the
rule of twelves (twelve AM, twelve FM, and twelve television
stations) for six years. 133 The limitation will be completely elimi127. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
F.C.C.2d 306, 307 (1970):
The concentration of control rules aim at achieving the aforementioned twofold
objective [fostering maximum competition in broadcasting and promoting diversification of programming sources and viewpoints] nationally and regionally by
providing that a license for a broadcast station will not be granted to a party if the
grant would result in that party's owning, operating, or controlling more than a
specified number of stations in the same broadcast service. For AM the number is
7, for FM it is 7, and for TV it is 7, with no more than 5 being VHF. The rules
also provide that a grant will not be made, even though it would not result in
exceeding these specified maximums, if it would result in undue concentration of
control contrary to the public interest ....
Id. (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 48, 50, and accompanying text.
129. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public ....
"). See also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
130. As early as 1967, President Reagan, then Governor of California, opposed what
he saw as a trend toward increased restraint on the commercial broadcasting industry.
THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF BROADCASTING 187 (Broadcasting Publications 1982).
131. Many broadcasters, and the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), a
powerful industry lobby, filed comments with the Commission in connection with all
three actions (the Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984), the Duopoly
Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723 (1989), and the One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec.
1741 (1989)). See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
132. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1984).
133. Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 18 (1984). Minority group own-
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nated in 1990,134 assuming that the Commission decides, as it is

likely to, 35 that the public interest would not be adversely affected. This final delimitation will allow a single group owner to
own as many radio and television stations as it cares to and can
afford to buy.
In 1989, the Commission relaxed the radio duopoly rule:"3 6
where the rule originally prohibited the overlap of the 1 mv/m
contours of commonly owned AM or FM stations,"' the new relaxed rule prohibits the overlap of the 3.16 mv/m contours of
commonly owned FM stations and the 5 mv/m contours of commonly owned AM stations. 3 8 The new rule eliminates the discrimination against AM stations caused by the earlier uniform 1
mv/m standard for both AM and FM stations; however, it also
allows commonly owned AM or commonly owned FM stations to
be considerably closer together than before,' 89 and more people
will be able to receive relatively strong signals from two different
stations in the same service owned by the same entity. The
Commission seems no longer concerned that the proximity of
commonly owned stations will cause an undue concentration of
control within a local area; it justifies this by referring to the
expansion that has taken place in the "communications marketplace" since the original rule was promulgated. "0
ers may own up to 14 television stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(i) (1988).
134. Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d at 18.
135. Alfred Sikes, who became Chairman of the Commission in 1989, generally favors the deregulation of broadcasting. Harris, Biz Sikes Up For FCC Boss; Where Is He
on the Issues?, Variety, July 5, 1989, at 43, col. 3.
136. Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723 (1988).
137. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
138. These are the so-called primary city grade signal contours. The AM and FM
contours were different (5 mv/m for AM, 3.16 mv/m for FM) because AM radios are
typically less sensitive than FM radios; a signal strength of 1 mv/m produces a less listenable signal on an AM radio than it does on an FM radio. See supra note 82.
Because the old duopoly rule used the 1 mv/m standard for both AM and FM stations, it discriminated against commonly owned AM stations: two or more commonly
owned FM stations conforming to the rule could readily be heard in the area where the
signals intersected, while for commonly owned AM stations the signals could not be
heard as well in the area in which they intersected.
139. Common ownership of two stations in the same service in the same principal
city will continue to be prohibited. Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723 (1988).
140. Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1726. The Commission referred to the increased number of radio and television stations, as well as to cable television and home
video cassette recorders (VCRs). Id.
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The one-to-a-market rule' now provides for favorable commission review of waiver requests. These waivers, which will allow new radio/television cross ownership within the same market, will likely be granted in certain circumstances.""
In combination, the relaxation or elimination of these three
rules will now make it possible for a single entity to own and
control stations which blanket the entire country. It will also be
possible for this single entity to own more than one station in
the same service which can be heard or viewed in the same geographic area. Finally, single entities will be allowed, in many situations, to own both radio and television stations in the same
market. The Commission has decided that "marketplace forces"
will create natural limits on these tendencies, and that these
"natural" forces are in some way better than the "artificial" limitations on multiple ownership imposed by commission
regulation.
IV. A New Development: Twenty-Four-Hour Satellite Radio
Programming Services
A development which has had a profound impact on the
broadcasting industry is the emergence of satellite distribution
of network programming. In 1979, the noncommercial network
National Public Radio became the first radio network to deliver
all of its programming to member stations via high fidelity communications satellite."'3 This was the first time that live, high
fidelity stereo distribution of programming to hundreds of stations nationwide was possible on a regular basis. Commercial radio networks soon followed, and by 1983 most were distributing
their programming via satellite.""'
141. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
142. There are three situations in which the Commission will favorably review
waiver requests: first, in the top 25 television markets when there would be at least 30
independently-owned "voices" in the market after the proposed consolidation (a "voice"
is a station or group of stations in a single market under common ownership), One-to-aMarket Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1741, 1751-52 (1989); second, in markets other than the
top 25 where a financially failed station is involved in the proposed consolidation, id. at
1752-53; and third, any other circumstances, subject to a more rigorous case-by-case review by the Commission, id. at 1753-54.
143. Lowenstein, Satellite Distribution: Lifeline for Public Radio in the United
States, EBU REv., July 1987, at 24.
144. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Sudikoff, Chairman and Chief Executive Of-
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Traditionally, networks, both radio and television, served a
station by bringing it national programming (entertainment,
news, and public affairs) with which it could supplement its local programming. This national programming was often too expensive for a local station to produce on its own. Affiliation with
a network thus allowed a local station to concentrate its resources on producing local programming.
During the 1980s, a period during which the Commission
embarked upon the wholesale deregulation of broadcasting, 45 a
new type of network developed. These new networks are
designed to provide subscribing stations with twenty-four hour a
day programming formats, delivered in high fidelity stereo via
satellite. The only local material transmitted by the stations is
typically a few minutes each hour of local commercials; all of the
programming (which is exclusively, or nearly exclusively, entertainment and national commercials) is supplied by the
networks.'"
In communication theory, one who controls a communication channel is known as a gatekeeper. 47 Under traditional regulation, the Commission's policy of maximizing diversity of programming and viewpoints was served by its corollary policy of
maximizing the number of gatekeepers. 48 Even disregarding the
effects of the Commission's elimination or relaxation of the multiple ownership," 9 duopoly,' 50 and one-to-a-market rules,' 5 ' the
development of satellite-delivered twenty-four-hour programming services has significantly reduced the number of gatekeepers in radio, despite the increase in the number of stations during the past thirty years. 52 These networks have virtually
ficer, IDB Communications Group, Inc., Los Angeles, Cal. (Apr. 10, 1990).
145. See supra note 95.
146. Stations are no longer explicitly required to air any news and public affairs at
all. See supra notes 99-105 and 117-20 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., R. HIEBERT, D. UNGURAIT, & T. BOHN, MASS MEDIA 25, 114-25 (1979).
148. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
152. Stations that air substantially all of their programming from these programming services have, in effect, delegated the gatekeeping function to the services, contrary
to the prohibition against delegation of control to another. See FCC Report on Chain
Broadcasting, quoted in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 205
(1943). See also Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, supra note 68, at 2311-12
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eliminated local programming on a significant number
stations.15
V.

of

Analysis

"What sort of part do I play .

.

. ? Is it an important part?"

"Just about the most important part in the show."
"The lead?"
"No, the commercial."
- Make Room for Daddy, 1959.
In 1959 it was a joke on a television sitcom. Today it is the
government-sanctioned reality. The many deregulatory actions

("The licensee, is, in effect, a 'trustee' in the sense that his license to operate his station
imposes upon him a nondelegable duty to serve the public interest in the community he
had chosen to represent as a broadcaster.").
153. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2500 radio stations air programming
from the 12 largest satellite programming services for between 12 and 24 hours a day.
Telephone interview with Robert Unmacht, Editor of THE M STREET JOURNAL, a broadcast industry newsletter based in Alexandria, Va. (Apr. 11, 1990).
One of the largest satellite programming services, Satellite Music Network (SMN),
was recently purchased by Capital Cities/ABC. Radio World, Sept. 6, 1989, at 2, col. 3.
SMN provides programming to about 1000 radio stations. Id.
In addition, Capital Cities/ABC also operates a number of other radio networks,
including: ABC Talkradio, with 350 affiliates, Letter from Rich Wood, Director of Station Relations, Talk Programming, ABC Radio Networks (Mar. 19, 1990); ABC Contemporary, with 223 affiliates, BROADCASTING CABLE YEARBOOK 1989 F-44 to F-45 (Broadcasting Publications 1989); ABC FM, with 139 affiliates, id. at F-45; ABC Rock, with 102
affiliates, id. at F-45 to F-46; ABC Information with 553 affiliates, id. at F-46 to F-47;
ABC Entertainment, with 555 affiliates, id. at F-47 to F-48; ABC Direction, with 388
affiliates, id. at F-48 to F-49. ABC thus supplies programming to 2310 radio stations
across the country, or about 25% of all the commercial radio stations in the United
States. (This figure does not include the 1000 stations carrying programming from
SMN). Additionally, the ABC Television Network has 223 affiliates. Id. at F-44.
One can gain additional perspective on Capital Cites/ABC's impact in the marketplace of ideas when one considers that the company owns eight major-market television
stations reaching 24.4% of total ADI (Area of Dominant Influence) television homes.
CAPITAL CITEs/ABC, INC., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1990). (The Commission prohibits
common ownership of television stations which collectively reach 25% or more of ADI
television homes. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(1988).) Capital Cities/ABC owns 11 AM and 10
FM stations, including AM/FM/TV combinations in three cities, AM/FM combinations
in seven cities, and an AM/TV combination in one city. Annual Report at 11-12. Its
radio stations reach 25.7% of the United States. Id. at 12. It owns 10 daily and 77 weekly
newspapers, id. at K-9, and 79 other consumer, special interest, and trade publications.
Id. at K-10 to K-12. Additionally, it owns significant interests in three cable television
networks: 33% of Lifetime, 38% of Arts & Entertainment (A&E), and 80% of Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN). Id. at 12-13.
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taken by the Commission have changed the face of the broadcasting industry, and have had a devastating effect on the public
interest standard, not to mention the public interest itself.""
Originally, radio and television stations "paid" for the otherwise essentially free use of the frequencies allocated to them' 5 5
by fulfilling certain programming obligations.1 56 The requirement that stations fulfill these obligations was intended to serve
the public interest by ensuring that the public's first amendment
right to be informed was satisfied. In no sense, then, was a station's use of a frequency "free"; nor was it permanent.'5 7

154. Lorenzo Milam, who has built and operated a number of noncommercial community-based radio stations, wrote in his whimsically titled book, SEX AND
BROADCASTING:

Broadcasting as it exists now in the United States is a pitiful, unmitigated
whore. At some stage in its history, there was a chance to turn it to a creative,
artful, caring medium; but then all the toads came along, realizing the power of
radio and television to hawk their awful wares. The saga of broadcasting in
America is littered with the bodies of those who wanted to do something significant - and who were driven out [or more correctly, sold out] by the pimps and
thieves who now run the media.
L. MILAM, SEX AND BROADCASTING: A HANDBOOK ON STARTING A RADIO STATION FOR THE
COMMUNITY 19 (3d ed. 1975) (emphasis and brackets in original).
155. At various times, the Commission has charged fees associated with broadcast
applications; however, it has never collected anything in the nature of a spectrum use
fee. Telephone interview with James Gattuso, Deputy Chief, Office of Plans and Policy,
Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 20, 1990).
156. For example, stations had to undertake formal studies to determine the
problems and needs of their communities. See supra note 68. They had to air a certain
amount of nonentertainment programming. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a)(8) (1982). Under the
fairness doctrine, they had to provide balanced presentation of issues of public importance in their local community. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70
(1969).
157. The continuing requirement that each station fulfill these programming obligations was enforced by the Commission's license renewal procedures. Broadcast licenses
were issued for a period of three years. 47 U.S.C.A. § 307(d) (1962). As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (95 Stat.) 736 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1982)), Congress authorized
the Commission to extend broadcast license terms. In 1987, the Commission increased
license terms to seven years for radio stations and five years for television stations. Order, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 3805 (1987).
Six months before the license's expiration date, the licensee was required to notify
the public, normally on the air, that it was applying for renewal of its license, 47 C.F.R. §
73.3580(d) (1988), so that members of the public, if dissatisfied with the station's programming, could challenge the renewal by filing either a petition to deny the renewal or
a competing application to take over the frequency. Applications challenging the license
of an incumbent licensee must normally be filed no later than one month before the
license's expiration date. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3516(e) (1988).
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All of this changed under deregulation. The Commission's
elimination of the nonentertainment programming guidelines, 6 8
the ascertainment requirements, 59 and the fairness doctrine 6 0
have left stations with no explicit programming obligations at
all. In eliminating the nonentertainment guidelines and the ascertainment requirements, the Commission stated that licensees
would still have to exercise "good faith discretion" in ascertaining the needs of their communities,' to be "responsive to the
issues facing their community, 16 2 and to continue to adhere to
the fairness doctrine.6 3 It trusted that stations would continue
to provide news and public affairs programming because of
"market forces.' ' 6 4 When the Commission declared the fairness
doctrine unconstitutional in 1987,165 stations were left with no
real regulatory or statutory requirements to air news or public
affairs programming, balanced or otherwise.
By eliminating these requirements, the Commission also
While incumbent licensees were entitled to a "reasonable expectation" of renewal
because of their substantial investment in their facilities, this procedure was designed to
ensure that stations failing to meet their programming obligations would face the possibility of non-renewal. Normally, a station's renewal application could be denied only
when the station failed to meet its programming obligations; the Commission was reluctant to deny license renewals or to deny applications for license transfer when members
of the public objected to the entertainment format (rock, top 40, classical, jazz, etc.) of
the station, or to a change of format. See Changes in Entertainment Formats, 37 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 1679 (1976). But see Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d
246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (disappearance of unique formats may justify Commission intervention).
When a renewal application was challenged, the Commission normally designated
the two (or more) applications for comparative hearing. See supra note 87.
158. The nonentertainment programming guidelines required stations to air a prescribed amount of nonentertainment programming. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a)(8) (1982). The
guidelines were eliminated in 1981. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
159. The ascertainment rules required stations to conduct formal studies every year
to determine the significant problems and needs of their communities and develop programs addressing those problems and needs. 53 F.C.C.2d 3 (1975); 27 F.C.C.2d 650
(1971). The rules were eliminated in 1981. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
160. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
161. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 998.
162. Id. at 978.
163. Id. at 979. The Commission had attempted to placate those who opposed its
elimination of the nonentertainment programming guidelines by stating that stations
would still be required to adhere to the fairness doctrine. Id. at 976, 979. See supra text
accompanying note 118.
164. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 978.
165. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987). See supra note 117.
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eliminated most of the standards by which a station would be
evaluated in a comparative hearing. 66 This substantially weakened the status of a renewal challenger, and increased the in1 8
1
cumbent licensee's expectation of renewal

67

to near certainty.

1

The effects of these deregulatory actions are not difficult to
judge. Television news programs are filled with increasingly sensational "hard" news, and many stations claim to be fulfilling
their public interest responsibilities by airing such programs as
A Current Affair and Geraldo.169 In a typical market, the aver166. For a brief description of the comparative hearing process, see supra notes 87,
90, 157, and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 157.
168. In the same proceeding in which it eliminated the radio nonentertainment programming guidelines, ascertainment requirements, and commercialization guidelines, see
supra note 5, the Commission also eliminated the requirement that stations maintain
program logs, the only official documents reflecting what was actually broadcast. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981). It also eliminated the program logging requirements for commercial television stations. Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).
Thus, there remain no official documents that renewal challengers may utilize to examine
an incumbent licensee's overall programming. Cf. R. HORWITz, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY
REFORM 210 (1989) ("[Tihe Reagan-sponsored Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 reduces
the recordkeeping and reporting obligations of regulated firms, thereby making the enforcement of rules more difficult.").
As if this were not bad enough, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) is
urging the elimination of the comparative license renewal process. Radio World, Feb. 22,
1989, at 10, col. 1. The House of Representatives has proposed a bill, H.R. 1136, which
would amend the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-805 (1982 & Supp. V
1987), to prohibit the filing of competing applications in connection with a station's license renewal application unless the station had either violated the Commission's rules
or failed to present any programming addressing local issues. Radio World, Apr. 12,
1989, at 1, col. 4. These actions appear to have been taken in response to the recent rash
of competing applications filed for the purpose of obtaining a cash settlement in exchange for the withdrawal of the applications.
Because the Commission has indicated, by its elimination of the nonentertainment
programming guidelines, that it is unwilling to require stations to provide any specific
amount of news and public affairs programming, it would appear that if a station
presented any amount of programming directed at local issues, the renewal of the station's license would be more or less automatic. This would virtually guarantee stations
permanent access to the frequencies assigned to them - in other words, possession, for
all intents and purposes. Contra supra note 47 and accompanying text. The House bill, if
enacted, would remove from the present licensing system the important safety valve
which provides a procedure under which broadcasters who do not serve the public interest can lose their licenses.
169. A brief examination of newspaper program descriptions for Geraldo is illuminating. For the week of November 6, 1989, the program was scheduled to cover the following topics: pregnant women behind bars, women in prison, teen-age prostitutes, and
nymphomaniacs. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, § 11 (Television), at 20, 26, 33, 45.
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age FM station airs three and one half minutes of news per
hour.' 70
The reasons for these programming responses to "market
forces" are clear. Originally, Congress and the Commission intended the broadcasting industry to play a crucially important
role in American society by contributing to the marketplace of
ideas through news and public affairs programming, and to lead
community discussions on issues of public importance. 171 By allowing stations to respond only to "market forces," the Commission has given every broadcast licensee carte blanche to operate
only with the maximization of its audience in mind - in other
words, to chase ratings, and so maximize its revenues, by giving
the public more of what it wants.1 72 This has turned upside
down the concept that stations are supposed to be community
leaders, exercising a public trust to fulfill the vital first amendment need of the public to be informed.1 73 Now stations are followers, responsible only to the financial bottom line.
Also turned upside down is the notion that stations exist
primarily to provide programming services for the public.17 4 In
theory, the station was the provider of a product. The product
was the programming, and the consumer of the product was the
listener or viewer. The public's first amendment right to be informed was the paramount concern in broadcast regulation.1 75
Advertisers provided necessary revenue to allow stations to provide this service in exchange for program sponsorship and com-

170. J. TUNSTALL, supra note 57, at 152. There are usually more radio stations in
larger markets than there are in smaller markets. Some stations in larger markets provide more substantial amounts of news and public affairs programming (for example, allnews stations in major markets). However, these stations often provide capsulized, headline-type coverage of news events, thus limiting the value of their service in a first
amendment context.
171. See supra notes 52-63, 94, and accompanying text.
172. Certainly, the public interest standard includes considerations of what the public wants to hear and view, but not to the exclusion of what it ought to hear and view.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text. However, the deregulatory actions the Commission has taken in recent years have encouraged stations to ignore all considerations
except what the public likes and wants. The Commission's maverick deregulatory actions
have trashed the first amendment concerns of Congress and the Supreme Court.
173. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
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mercial announcements. '
Now, with the economic marketplace as the only real regulator, the functions performed by the participants have changed.
The station provides a service by delivering a quantity of potential buying power - the listening or viewing public - to the
advertiser. The audience, or rather the potential buying power
that the audience represents, is the product; the advertiser is the
17
If
consumer of the product; and the station is the purveyor.
the ratings drop, the station scrambles to find out why. If, as is
usual, the programming is the "culprit," it is adjusted or
changed to recover the lost ratings points. Whereas radio or television stations once existed primarily to inform the public and
secondarily to provide entertainment, they now exist primarily
to deliver buying power to advertisers. The entertainment and
especially the informational functions have been reduced to secondary importance, at best.
This "free market" approach to broadcast regulation, or,
more accurately, non-regulation, has redefined the phrase "public interest, convenience, or necessity. 17 8 Originally, the public
interest standard contemplated programming that the public
ought to hear or view - the news and public affairs programming required by the first amendment public trust concept - along with what it wanted to hear or view (entertainment programming). 1 79 Now the standard contemplates only
programming that the public wants to hear or view - mostly
entertainment. A broadcast licensee which gives the public only
what it wants will achieve the maximum rating, ' 80 while a licen-

176. See supra text accompanying note 52.
177. The Commission itself acknowledged this characterization in the Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723, 1732 n.42 (1989).
178. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
179. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
180. The listening or viewing public decides what it likes, and listens to or views the
programming of the stations that provide it. This, of course, influences the ratings. The
stations respond to the ratings by adjusting their programming to maximize them. The
stations try to give the public more of what it likes and less of what it does not, as
evidenced by the ratings. With increased ratings, stations may charge more for advertising time. In short, stations attempt to maximize their profits by giving the public more
of what it wants. This is the goal of the economic marketplace to which the Commission
has left much broadcast regulation. This chase of maximum profits, unfettered in the
deregulated climate the Commission has created, tends to eliminate programming that
the public ought to hear or view but may not like (for example, news and public affairs
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see which airs public service programming (which is generally
less popular, and more expensive to produce) will likely suffer in
the ratings and thus in its profitability.
If one subscribes to the theory that, for the most part, the
public tends to sink to its lowest level of political, social, and
cultural awareness in the absence of countervailing forces, the
Commission's decision to allow the economic marketplace to regulate broadcasting is particularly disturbing. The electronic
mass media have unequaled power in contemporary American
society, and because of this power they have enormous responsibilities. However, the removal of regulations and the increasing
role of the economic marketplace allow stations to ignore the
public trust concept 8 1 and to use the publicly owned airwaves
solely for private gain with little corresponding public benefit.
This offends the whole history and theory of broadcast regulation, the Communications Act, and in this context, the first
amendment.
The public's first amendment right to receive a wide range
of information from diverse sources has thus been subordinated
to the desire of advertisers to reach the maximum amount of
buying power, and to the desire of stations to maximize their
profits by satisfying their advertisers. Deregulation has been extraordinarily beneficial for the broadcast industry. 2 Each station now has essentially permanent access to the broadcast
channel assigned to it. Although this channel is theoretically a
public resource,"' each licensee now has government approval to
program its station, or stations, with only "market forces" in
mind, maximizing its revenues through whatever programming
the "market" responds to. Moreover, each station has, for all intents and purposes, gained ownership of the frequency assigned
to it because of the near certainty of license renewal.'8 4
programming).
181. For a discussion of the public trust concept, see supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
182. In an editorial, BROADCASTING noted: "Between [outgoing FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick] and his predecessor, Mark Fowler, broadcasters and other Fifth Estaters
have had the best telecommunications policy run of their lives." End of an Era?, BROADCASTING, Apr. 10, 1989, at 98.
183. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 157. The electromagnetic spectrum is publicly owned, and the
Communications Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, provides that "no person is
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The Commission has thus allowed the broadcasting industry
to reap enormous profits from the use of publicly owned frequencies by allowing it to respond only to the forces of the economic marketplace, without corresponding public benefit and
therefore at the expense of the public's first amendment right to
'
be informed. 85

to have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license." FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
185. For a discussion of the public benefit and the public's right to be informed, see
supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
Broadcasters have long complained that any attempt by the government to regulate
programming constitutes an abridgment of their first amendment right of free speech.
See, e.g., T. SNIDER, Serving the Public Interest: Voluntarily or by Government Mandate?, in PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE BUSINESS OF BROADCASTING 87 (J. Powell & W. Gair
eds. 1988):
Broadcasters are in the business of communicating with the public through
their programming. So are newspapers, magazines, signs, direct mailers, and skywriters. But none of them is burdened with a content public interest standard.
Why are broadcasters singled out and saddled with a programming content
public interest standard by which they live or die? .. .Very simply, it's because
Congress, in violation of the First Amendment, decided to treat broadcasters as
second-class citizens. How long are we going to sit still for this?
Broadcasters are second class citizens in the business community. They can
never enjoy full freedom of speech until Congress passes a law that eliminates
comparative renewal based on programming content. Passage of such a law should
be the number-one priority of free, over-the-air broadcasters. The comparative
renewal process is an abomination that allows a challenge to a license based on
programming content promises. We broadcasters deserve license renewals like all
non-broadcast users of the spectrum when we adhere to technical standards. ...
We must not pay too high a price - and codifying the public interest standard
and the Fairness Doctrine is too high.
Comparative renewal proceedings involve contests between businessmen.
They have nothing to do with the public's rights. The public still has the right to
petition or complain, just as they do with other licensed businesses.
The airways are not, nor can they be, owned by the public. Broadcasters are
not public trustees. Indeed we do not have any more special obligation to the
public than other types of businesses that are licensed. We do not deserve to be
burdened with a "public interest" over and above technical operating standards in
order to get our licenses renewed or to eliminate comparative renewal. It is unfair
that we, and only we, are forced to operate under an unceasing threat by challengers who want to put us out of business - or the government, which wants to
control us by denying our First Amendment rights.
For too long we've allowed "Big Brother" to control us. For too long we've
meekly accepted unfair treatment and even outright discrimination. We have a
case, and we need to make it. We need to stand up and speak for ourselves. If we
don't, who will?
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It was in this pro-industry climate that the Commission
Id. at 89-93 (emphasis in original).
This argument entirely misses the point. First, the airwaves (or the "mther," as they
were somewhat poetically called in the early days of broadcast regulation) are deemed to
belong to the public. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Second, the airwaves are
"scarce" - there is simply an inadequate number of frequencies available to accommodate all of the people who wish to broadcast, notwithstanding the Commission's misplaced assertions about the increased number of stations and the availability of alternative technologies. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text; contra supra note 48
and accompanying text. On these foundations, Congress decided that broadcasting stations should be licensed only when they would serve the public interest, convenience, or
necessity. See supra text accompanying note 36.
Under this scheme, broadcasters are indeed public trustees, charged with the responsibility of using publicly owned frequencies for the benefit of the public. See McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 151 F.2d 597, 599 (3d Cir. 1945)
("a radio broadcasting station must operate in the public interest and must be deemed
to be a 'trustee' for the public."). See also Schaeffer Radio Co., a 1930 Federal Radio
Commission case, reprinted in part in The Federal Radio Commission and the Public
Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, 11 FED. COMM. B.J. 5 (1950):
A broadcasting station is public in purpose and character and any use of it as
a private or individual affair is repugnant both to policy and legislation. The conscience and judgment of a station's management are necessarily personal, but the
station itself must be operated as if owned by the public. No person may consider
broadcasting facilities as his mere personal chattel. It is as if people of a community should own a station and turn it over to the best man in sight with this
injunction: 'Manage this station in our interest. Furnish the programs and judgment and keep the pecuniary reward, if any, but remember it is our station, not
yours.' The standing of every station is determined by that conception. There is
no other foundation on which it may be established and maintained. Its value and
influence must rest entirely on its consecration to the public service.
Id. at 14.
It would be impossible for the Federal Communications Commission to satisfy its
congressional mandate without establishing at least some requirements concerning the
manner in which its broadcast licensees program their stations. The nonentertainment
programming guidelines and the fairness doctrine were directed toward promoting the
vigor of the broadcasting industry's contribution to the marketplace of ideas; they were
not attempts by the Commission to coerce stations to air programs on certain topics or
programs reflecting particular viewpoints. Any such-attempt would certainly not pass
constitutional muster, and would in any event violate the Communications Act. Section
326 of the Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted
by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed
by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943):
"With the number of radio channels limited by natural factors, the public interest
demands that those who are entrusted with the available channels shall make the
fullest and most effective use of them .. "
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dealt yet another blow to the public interest standard: stating
that the scarcity of broadcast frequencies was no longer a concern,1 s6 the Commission in 1984 relaxed the multiple ownership
rule1s7 to allow individual entities to own up to twelve AM,
twelve FM, and twelve television stations.' 8 8 This limitation will
likely be completely eliminated in 1990,189 allowing a single entity to own as many broadcast properties as it cares to. The
Commission also relaxed the local concentration provisions, 90

Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the the limited
facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of
expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by
all, some who wish to use it must be denied.
Id. at 218, 226 (quoting the Commission's Report on Chain Broadcasting). See also
supra note 52 and accompanying text; Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, supra
note 68.
Just as unprofitable is the complaint of broadcasters that they should be free of
government-imposed programming regulations because no such regulations could constitutionally be applied to the print media. The print media utilize private resources - paper and ink. Any person with financial resources adequate to purchase the
necessary supplies and equipment may start a newspaper or magazine. Broadcasters, on
the other hand, utilize a resource which is not only owned by the public, and which
therefore cannot be bought or sold, but also one of which there is an inadequate supply.
Anyone with adequate financial resources may purchase the equipment and supplies necessary to broadcast on radio or television. These assets typically cost a small fraction of
what it would cost to purchase an existing station. Yet without a license from the Commission, no transmitter may be put on the air. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) ("No person shall
use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals
by radio . . . except under and in accordance with this chapter and with a license in that
behalf granted under the provisions of this chapter."). In many areas of the country, no
frequencies are available, and the only access an otherwise qualified citizen has to the
airwaves is through the purchase of an existing station, often at grossly inflated prices.
See infra note 244.
Each broadcaster is granted government permission to use a slice of the publicly
owned airwaves to the absolute exclusion of any other potential user in that geographic
area. Great profits can be made from that use. The central first amendment concern
focuses on the public's right to receive information, not on the broadcaster's right to
speak with no restrictions. See supra note 51. For broadcasters to suggest that the government should be prohibited from requiring them to program their stations for the benefit of the public represents the height of hypocrisy and arrogance.
186. Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 19, 37-38 (1984); Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723, 1726-27 (1989); One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1741,
1743 (1989).
187. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 135.
190. The radio duopoly rule and the one-to-a-market rule were intended to reduce
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again stating that the scarcity of frequencies was no longer a
191
concern.
To support this contention, the Commission pointed to the
expansion of the communications marketplace that has occurred
since the original rules were promulgated.19 2 At that time, there
were far fewer radio and television stations than there are now,
and cable television service and home video cassette recorders
(VCRs) either did not exist or had not yet become an important
part of the communications marketplace. 193 Now, with more
than 9200 commercial radio stations, nearly 1100 commercial
television stations, and with cable television service and VCRs in
more than half of the television households in the United
States, 9 4 the Commission has concluded that broadcast channels are no longer scarce,1 95 and that restrictive government regulations are no longer justified.1 9
In this regard, the Commission has pulled a linguistic fast
one. There are two different definitions of "scarcity": first, it
may mean an inadequate supply; and second, it may mean a
small number. 7 Historically, the scarcity rationale justifying
broadcast regulation focused on the first definition: because the
electromagnetic spectrum was publicly owned, 9 8 because the
number of channels available for broadcasting was limited, and
because there were more people who wished to broadcast than
there were available channels, 199 the government had to determine which applicants were granted licenses to broadcast and

the possibility that a single owner would become overly dominant in a local market
through the ownership of two or more nearby stations in the same service or the ownership of both radio and television stations in the same market, respectively. See supra
notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
191. Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723, 1726-27 (1989); One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1741, 1742-43 (1989).
192. Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1726; One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C.
Rec. at 1743.
193. Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1726; One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C.
Rec. at 1743.
194. Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1726.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See FIRESTONE & JACKLIN, Deregulationand the Pursuit of Fairness, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE CITIZEN 111-12 (T. Haight ed. 1979).
198. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 48, 76, and accompanying text.
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which were not. In making this determination, the Commission
had to decide which applicants would best serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity.2"'
However, the Commission, in relaxing and eliminating the
multiple ownership and local concentration rules, has ignored
the fact that there is simply an insufficient number of frequencies to go around (the first definition of scarcity), and has focused instead on the overall size of the communication marketplace (what it considers to be a lack of scarcity, under the
second definition).2 " 1 This approach completely misses the point.
The goal of the multiple ownership and local concentration
rules was to avoid the tendency toward monopolistic control of
the broadcast mass media; this was to be effectuated by maximizing the number of gatekeepers.20 2 By allowing "market
forces" to regulate in these areas, the Commission has paved the
way for just such monopolistic control. If the multiple ownership
limitation is eliminated, a group owner will be able to own a very
large number of radio and television stations. The relaxation of
the radio duopoly rule will make it possible for a group owner to
own two or more stations in the same service that can be heard
in the same area.20 3 The relaxation of the one-to-a-market rule
will allow increased cross-ownership of radio and television stations in the same market. Under deregulation, a single group
owner could theoretically own stations that blanket the entire
country. Moreover, there could be significant geographical areas
in which two or more of this owner's radio stations could be
heard simultaneously; and finally, this owner could own television stations in many of the same markets in which it also
owned radio stations.
This scenario, admittedly extreme, will be possible if the
Commission lifts the "rule of twelves"2 4 in 1990, as is expected.20 5 This is especially true now that the local concentra-

200. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. See also
supra note 197, at 107.
201. See FIRESTONE & JACKLIN, supra note 197, at 111-12.
202. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 132, 133, and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 135.
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tion rules have been relaxed. 0 6
These rules, which were intended to ensure maximum diversification of viewpoints and programming through maximum di-

versification of ownership,' 0 7 have been swept aside because the

Commission incorrectly considers the scarcity rationale to be obsolete in light of the increased size of the communication marketplace. Ironically, the Commission states that it still considers
diversity of viewpoints and programming to be important,0 8 but
it says that there is not necessarily a connection between these
and diversity of ownership 09
The Commission is allowing the number of gatekeepers to
shrink, and is thus opening the door for precisely the kind of
concentrated control that Congress, the courts, and at one time
the Commission itself feared would develop in the absence of
limiting regulations. Even before deregulation, the number of
gatekeepers was not as large as it might have been. The prevalence of the television networks had decreased the number of
gatekeepers long before deregulation. The ABC television net206. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text. While the scenario may be extreme, it is not unrealistic. In cable television, an industry in which ownership is essentially unregulated, Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), a cable multiple system owner,
owns 692 cable systems serving over 9.5 million subscribers. BROADCASTING CABLE YEARBOOK 1989 D-308, D-309 (Broadcasting Publications 1989). TCI also has interests in numerous other systems serving over 3.1 million additional subscribers. Id. at D-300 to 311.
There are a total of approximately 47 million cable subscribers in the United States. Id.
at D-3. This means that a single company owns or has interests in cable systems that
serve more than 25 percent of all the cable subscribers in the country. As if this were not
sufficiently concentrated, TCI recently bought a 50 percent interest in Showtime Networks Inc., which owns the cable premium services Showtime and The Movie Channel.
TCI Makes Its Equity Play for Showtime, BROADCASTING, Oct. 23, 1989, at 40, col. 1.
Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) called this acquisition "an alarming development in the continuing saga of TCI's drive to dominate the industry." Id.
207. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
208. The Commission focused on viewpoint diversity in the Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 24-31 (1984). See also the Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723,
(1989) ("[T]he ultimate objectives of the duopoly rule, like our other multiple ownership
rules, have been to promote economic competition and diversity of programming and
viewpoints in order to further the public interest ..
"); the One-to-a-Market Decision,
4 F.C.C. Rec. 1741, 1742 (1989) ("[T]he ultimate objective of the radio-television crossownership rule is to enhance consumer welfare through the promotion of economic competition and diversity of programming and viewpoints.") (emphasis in original); id. at
1743 ("It is important to realize that we are retaining our traditional concern for encouraging diversity of programming and viewpoints ....
").
209. Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d at 31-34 (1984); Duopoly Decision,
4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1727; One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1744.
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work, for example, has 223 affiliates. 10 During prime time, when
by definition the largest number of people are watching television, ABC thus provides programming to more than twenty percent of the commercial television stations in the United
States.2 1 ' CBS and NBC command similar percentages;2 1 2 thus,
fifty-seven percent of the commercial television stations in the
country are "controlled" by three gatekeepers during the time
that the largest number of people are watching.
The emergence during the 1980s of twenty-four hour satellite radio networks has drastically reduced the number of gatekeepers in that medium as well. One of the largest such networks, Satellite Music Network (SMN), has more than 1000
radio affiliates.21 3 While these stations are not owned by SMN,
they are controlled by it just as television network affiliates are
controlled by their networks.21 4 Thus, there are more than 1000
fewer gatekeepers among the 9200 commercial radio stations in
the United States than there would be without SMN.
Exacerbating the situation is the fact that SMN was purchased by ABC in 1989.215 This means that ABC, a single gatekeeper, now controls twenty percent of the commercial television
stations during prime time and about eleven percent of the commercial radio stations for substantial portions of each day. These
figures do not include the 2310 radio stations affiliated with
ABC's seven other radio networks.2 16 If this is not an example of
unduly concentrated control, it is difficult to imagine what
would be.
The new prevalence of the twenty-four hour satellite networks has been made possible largely by the Commission's elim-

210. BROADCASTING CABLE YEARBOOK 1989 F-44 (Broadcasting Publications 1989).
211. Strictly speaking, network affiliation does not strip a station's owner of control
over its own station: the station owner may reject network programming. However, network affiliation brings large revenues to many stations, and most elect to carry substantially all of the networks' prime time programming. Thus, the networks have de facto
control over the stations during prime time.
212. The CBS television network has more than 200 affiliates. BROADCASTING CABLE
YEARBOOK 1989 F-50 (Broadcasting Publications 1989). NBC has 203 affiliates. Id. at F55.
213. Radio World, Sept. 6, 1989, at 2, col. 3.
214. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
215. Radio World, Sept. 6, 1989, at 2, col. 3.
216. See supra note 153.
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ination of the nonentertainment guidelines2 17 and the fairness
doctrine.21 8 The drastic reduction in the number of gatekeepers
occasioned by the popularity of these networks among stations
should cause the Commission to take every possible step to maximize diversity of ownership. Instead, it has done just the
opposite. 1 9
The situation is no better in the expanded communication
marketplace t o which the Commission referred when it relaxed
the multiple ownership and local concentration regulations.
While it is certainly true that cable television service brings an
increased number of channels into each subscriber's home, the
number of gatekeepers is limited.220 The Commission's references to VCRs are similarly misplaced. While it may be true
that most homes now have at least one VCR, it is inappropriate
to rely on the VCR's popularity in eliminating or relaxing regulations intended to ensure the vigor of the marketplace of
ideas.2 21

217. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981). See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
218. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987). See supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
219. The Commission relaxed the multiple ownership rule, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984),
and proposed eliminating any restriction on the number of stations an individual entity
may own. Id. at 18. This reduces the number of gatekeepers nationwide. The Commission also relaxed the radio duopoly rule, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723 (1989), and the one-to-amarket rule, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1741 (1989), thus allowing the number of gatekeepers in local
markets to shrink.
220. For example, Cable News Network, CNN Headline News, Turner Network Television (TNT), and Superstation WTBS are all owned by Ted Turner's Turner Broadcasting System, a single gatekeeper. BROADCASTING CABLE YEARBOOK 1989 D-318 (Broadcasting Publications 1989). Home Box Office owns Cinemax. Id.- Nickelodeon/Nick at
Nite, Music Television (MTV), and Video Hits One (VH-1) are under common ownership, as are The Movie Channel and Showtime. Id. Recall that TCI also owns 50 percent
of Showtime. See supra note 206.
Twenty years ago, former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson noted that cable
television "offers some reason to hope for an end to the tyranny of banal mass-audience
programming we have all come to know, if not love." N. JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO
YOUR TELEVISION SET 152 (1970). In 1989, the television critic Tom Shales noted: "When
cable TV started, we were promised cultural enrichment, a cornucopia of diversity and
programming aimed at minority interests. What we got was music videos, programlength commercials, and home shopping networks." The Herald Statesman (Yonkers,
N.Y.), Nov. 16, 1989, § B (Lifestyles), at 1, col. 1 (reprinted with permission from The
Washington Post Writers Group, Nov. 16, 1989).
221. People who own VCRs usually use them for recording programs on broadcast
television or cable and watching them at different times. National Association of Broad-
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In spite of its obligations under the Communications Act of
1934,222 the Commission has replaced the public interest standard, imposed on it by Congress, with its own private interest
standard. The beneficiary of this standard is, of course, the
broadcast industry. The Commission eliminated or relaxed restrictions on the industry in two major areas - news and public affairs programming and multiple ownership - relying on
strikingly parallel reasoning: first, it eliminated one regulation,
justifying this by stating that stations would still have to satisfy
a second regulation; then it eliminated or substantially relaxed
the second regulation. When the Commission eliminated the
nonentertainment programming guidelines,2 2 it stated that
broadcasters would still be required to broadcast these types of
programming through adherence to the fairness doctrine.2 24 In
1987, the fairness doctrine was eliminated.2 25 In 1984, the Commission relaxed the national multiple ownership rule (the rule of
sevens),2 2 stating that "the appropriate market for ideas is pri-

marily local

.... ",227

Implicit in this statement is that continued

restrictions on local multiple ownership would minimize the
marginal decrease in diversity the Commission expected to occur
when the rule of sevens was relaxed or eliminated. In 1989, the
Commission substantially relaxed the local multiple ownership
rules.2 2
Through this process of inverse bootstrapping, the Commis-

casters, VCR Audience/Market Profiles & Advertisers' Intentions, 6 Broadcast Marketing & Technology News 5, April/May 1989. This makes the VCR merely an extension of
those media. VCRs are also commonly used for watching rented or borrowed movies.
Caravatt, Videocassettes Explore the Demographics, American Demographics (Dec.
1985) (reprinted as Research Memo, Videocassettes and the New Specialty Tape Market,
National Ass'n of Broadcasters (Dec. 1985)). The entertainment value of a VCR is clear,
but VCRs do not play a significant role in the first amendment marketplace of ideas.
222. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-805 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
223. See supra notes 6 and 99 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 79, 80, and accompanying text. The rule of sevens was changed
to the rule of twelves in 1984; in 1990, the Commission will likely remove any limitation
on national multiple ownership. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
227. Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 54 (1984).
228. The duopoly and one-to-a-market rules, which restrict local multiple ownership, are collectively known as the local concentration rules. See supra note 84; notes
136-42 and accompanying text.
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sion has made it abundantly clear that the broadcast industry,
and not the public, is the beneficiary of deregulation. 229 In each
of the three multiple ownership proceedings, the Commission relied heavily on comments submitted by members or representatives of the industry. 3 ° It referred repeatedly in all three proceedings to the cost savings that stations would realize if the
rules were eliminated or relaxed,23 and it stated that these cost
savings could possibly result in increased news and public affairs programming. 232 The Commission thus employed a kind of
balancing process, weighing the concededly speculative benefits
to the public, brought on by the cost savings that stations would
realize, against the loss to the public of the benefits of maximum
diversification of ownership. The subordination of the public interest to the private interest of the industry is evident when one
considers that the Commission has the power to regulate in
these areas. It may require stations to air certain amounts of
news and public affairs programming, as it did through its
nonentertainment programming guidelines;2 33 it may require sta229. The significance of this has not been lost on the industry. See supra note 182
and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., the Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 25 nn.22 & 24, 31
nn.47-61, 41 nn.63-72 & 81, 44 n.100, 52 n.124, 53 n.128, 54 n.130 (1984); the Duopoly
Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. 1723, 1730 nn.15-23 & 25, 1732 nn.50-56 & 58 (1989); and the
One-to-a-Market Decision, 7 F.C.C. Rec. 1741, 1755 nn.16-22 & 26, 1757 nn.42-44 & 49,
1758 n.58, 1759 n.73, 1760, nn.73-80 & 95 (1989).
231. Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d at 45-46; Duopoly Decision, 4
F.C.C. Rec. at 1725, 1727; One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1746-47.
232. "[Glroup ownership can foster news gathering, editorializing and public affairs
Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d at 44-45 (emphasis
programming .....
added). "[Tihe cost savings and aggregated resources of combined radio-radio operations
may also contribute to programming benefits to the public, especially with regard to the
type of programming that the multiple ownership rules were intended to encourage - news, public affairs, and non-entertainment programming." Duopoly Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1727 (emphasis added). "[Tihe cost savings and aggregated resources of combined radio-television operations may also contribute to programming
benefits to the extent that there may be more news, public affairs and other non-entertainment programming." One-to-a-Market Decision, 4 F.C.C. Rec. at 1748 (emphasis
added).
Ironically, the Commission noted in the multiple ownership decision that "[t]he Supreme Court has instructed that the public interest standard that governs the Commission's policies invites reference to First Amendment principles. A cherished First
Amendment principle crowns speech that addresses political or public affairs with maximum constitutional protection because of its centrality to efficacious democratic government." Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d at 35 (citation omitted).
233. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a)(8) (1982).
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tions to provide balanced coverage of issues of public importance, as it did under the fairness doctrine;23 4 and it may limit
multiple ownership, both nationally and locally, to ensure that
the public enjoys the benefit of maximum diversification, as it
did through its multiple ownership,2 35 duopoly,5 3 and one-to-awas considered essential
market 37 rules. Each of these 2policies
3
to the public interest standard. 1
However, rather than require stations to meet both requirements of the standard (that they program a prescribed amount
of news and public affairs programming,2 3 9 and that ownership
diversification be maximized 240 ), which it concedes are important,241 the Commission will now allow ownership diversification
to be reduced, perhaps substantially, in the hope that stations
combined opmay invest some of the money they save through
2 42
eration in news and public affairs programming.
The effects of this are clear. Before deregulation, stations
"paid" for the use of the frequencies assigned to them by, among
other things, airing news and public affairs programming responsive to community needs.24 3 These types of programming are not
inexpensive to produce; but stations were required to air them
as a benefit to the public corresponding to the public's inability
to use the channel or allocate it to another user. All programming expenses, including those incurred in the production of
this required programming, were paid for out of the stations'
revenues.
Now, despite the often enormous profitability of broadcast
properties, 244 the Commission has decided that stations must be

234. See supra notes 94, 118, and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
2
239. See 47 C.F.R. § 0. 81(a)(8) (1982).
240. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 79-98 and
accompanying text.
242. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
244. The only commercial classical music FM station in Los Angeles was recently
sold for $55 million. Beacham, Gold Fever Strikes LA's Radio Market, Radio World,
Sept. 27, 1989, at 1, 22. The new owner immediately changed the format to contemporary hits. Id. at 1. The media consultant Jeff Pollack noted that the Commission's lifting
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"paid" to air news and public affairs programming, which is unof the anti-trafficking rules has placed radio in the hands of impatient investment bankers seeking short term solutions to generate cash necessary to pay off their huge debts.
He stated that when buyers "spend $55 million on a station, they don't want to hear
[long term plans] to develop an audience .... They want it now." Radio World, Oct. 25,
1989, at 2, col. 4.
In a discouraging editorial, Radio World noted:
The loss of commercial classical radio in LA touches on issues which go beyond that of one format or one city's listenership.
The decision by new owners of KFAC to compete with the plethora of rock
music stations was clearly the result of the financial speculation running rampant
in the radio industry.
Record-breaking station prices continue to carry a heavy debt service and
force new owners to take drastic revenue-producing action.
In some stations this takes the form of cutbacks which take their toll on the
technical plant. In other markets, the cost is one of format diversity, as is the case
with KFAC, which was LA's only commercial classical station.
While the demise of the three-year anti-trafficking rule is certainly a factor in
the leveraged buyouts, it is by no means the only culprit.
Reducing a station's value to that of an "investment" is a far cry from the
public interest mandate of the Communications Act of 1934.
While it's true that a prosperous station is in a better position to serve its
community of license, it's also true that when financial gain is the sole motivation
for station acquisition the concerns of the public - as well as many in the broadcast industry - can get lost in the shuffle.
The newly seated FCC should take a second look at its deregulatory policies
and weigh them carefully against public interest concerns.
And those involved in the buying and selling would do well to factor in the
idea of service to their communities of license along with entrepreneurial
concerns.
A broadcast license should be more than a license to make money.
Radio World, Sept. 27, 1989, at 5.
The Commission, in a moment of almost unparalleled arrogance, stated that the
scarcity rationale, which has justified the regulation of broadcasting since 1927, no longer
justifies limits on multiple ownership. Multiple Ownership Decision, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 19
(1984). Contra supra note 48 and accompanying text. The Commission stated that "because broadcasting stations can be purchased, typically the only genuine barrier to entry
into broadcasting is insufficient capital, as is the case regarding entry into the newspaper
field." 100 F.C.C.2d at 19-20 (footnote omitted). It went on to note that its elimination of
the multiple ownership rule would not adversely affect minority ownership of broadcasting stations. Id. at 46-49.
The Commission has done practically all it can to allow station prices to skyrocket.
It has eliminated the nonentertainment programming guidelines, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981),
and the fairness doctrine, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987), among others. Now stations are
relatively unfettered in their pursuit of maximum ratings and maximum revenues. The
Commission eliminated the anti-trafficking rule, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081 (1982),
which was intended to exclude from station ownership those seeking quick profits.
There is often an enormous difference between the costs involved in starting a new
station - analogous to the startup costs of any new business - and the costs involved
in purchasing an existing station. By ignoring this difference, the Commission has made
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likely to be as profitable as most entertainment programming.
The payment is in the cost savings stations will enjoy because of
the relaxation or elimination of the multiple ownership rules;
and paying the bill is the public, who not only provides the real
dollars keeping stations on the air,2 45 but who must now also pay
the price in terms of the effects of reduced diversification of
ownership.
VI.

Conclusion

The Federal Communications Commission has a congressional mandate to regulate broadcasting under the public interest standard. During the first forty-five years of its existence, the
Commission established a number of rules and procedures intended to ensure that each broadcast station serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity. However, during the 1980s,
it has eliminated or relaxed many of those provisions, preferring
to leave regulation in those areas to "market forces."
The "market" to which the Commission has repeatedly referred is not the marketplace of ideas, the first amendment concept so central to a functioning democracy. Rather, the Commission has based many of its deregulatory actions on the economic
marketplace. The benefit to the broadcast industry is clear: stations are more profitable than ever; they are being bought and
sold for skyrocketing prices; and they are unfettered by restrictive regulations.
However, the Commission's first responsibility is to the
public interest, not to the private interest of the. industry it is
supposed to be regulating. It must reconsider the impact of deregulation on the public interest. It has the power to require stations to air programming that contributes to the marketplace of
ideas. It also has the power to establish rules designed to maximize the diversification of station ownership. Under deregulation, the public is being cheated out of the beneficial use of its

clear the real purpose behind its deregulatory moves: to turn a broadcasting license, insofar as possible, into a license to make money with little or no corresponding public
benefit.
245. The audience buys the products and services provided by the advertisers, presumably at least in part because of the broadcast commercials, and the advertisers pay
the stations for the commercial airtime. See supra text accompanying note 177.
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airwaves because of greedy, and increasingly unregulated, exploitation by private entities.
Deregulation has had a devastating effect on the public interest standard and on the public interest itself. If the Commission is unwilling to reregulate the broadcast industry, Congress
must act to see that it does.
Marc Sophosf

t This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Eric William Didul (1968-1990).
During his short life, Eric developed a real love for broadcasting, and a dedication to its
betterment. Those of us who are fortunate enough to have known him are left to speculate on what he might have accomplished.
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